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Viewing cable 06OSLO759, SRI LANKA TALKS DISINTEGRATE IN OSLO

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Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06OSLO759	2006-06-12 13:57	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Oslo

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3955964.ece>

VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNY #0759/01 1631357
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121357Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4136
INFO RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0338
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1232
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1043
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0138
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1360
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0417
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 3021
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1568
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000759
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [MARR](#) [PINS](#) [CE](#) [NO](#)
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA TALKS DISINTEGRATE IN OSLO
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Mike Hammer, Reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

1.(C) Summary. Oslo talks scheduled between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) abruptly terminated before even starting on June 8. The talks were meant to assess the current situation in Sri Lanka and address the safety (and security) of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). According to Norway's Special Envoy to Sri Lanka Jon Hanssen-Bauer, the talks did not occur for a variety of reasons, including the LTTE's intent to only speak with Norway (refusing to directly deal with the GSL delegation), objection to the composition of the GSL delegation and its dissatisfaction with the EU's recent designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization. Hanssen-Bauer noted that the GSL delegation was instructed by its government to return home, given that the GSL "felt that its delegation arrived in Norway on a different premise." The Norwegians, concerned with the state of affairs in Sri Lanka, drafted letters to both the Sri Lankan President and the LTTE's leader which requested responses to five "critical" questions. Responses to these questions are due by June 20. End Summary.

Norwegian Press Statement: "Grave Situation" in Sri Lanka

2.(U) The Norwegian government issued a press statement on June 8, which stated that the reason for the Oslo meeting's cancellation was based upon LTTE objections. In addition, the statement implicitly addressed the recent EU terrorist organization designation, noting that the LTTE would not accept SLMM monitors originating from states which included the LTTE on terrorist organization lists. The press statement pointed out that 37 out of the 57 SLMM monitors originated from such countries.

3.(U) Stating that the Norwegian government was "profoundly concerned" with the situation, Norwegian Minister of International Development Solheim sent letters to the GSL President and the LTTE leader posing the following questions:

a. Will the parties stand committed to the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 22 February 2002?

b. Do the parties want the continued existence and operation of the SLMM as a mission coordinated, facilitated and led by the Royal Norwegian Government with diplomatic immunity to ensure its impartial operation?

c. Are the parties able to provide full security guarantees for all monitors, employees and physical assets of the SLMM in all situations, in accordance with CFA Article 3.9?

d. Will the parties accept amendments to CFA Article 3.5 in order to enable the continued functioning of the SLMM at its current operational levels and with necessary security guarantees?

e. In the event that the amendments to Article 3.5 are made, will the parties provide full security guarantees for current SLMM personnel and assets during a six-month transition phase until an amended solution has been identified, decided and fully implemented?

The Norwegian government stipulated that responses were to be provided by June 20, 2006.

Hanssen-Bauer's Briefing

4.(C) On June 12 Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer held a special briefing for Norway's diplomatic corps, discussing the issues raised in the June 8 press statement. While addressing the various questions in the letter from Minister Solheim, Hanssen-Bauer specifically addressed the point concerning amendments to the SLMM composition. He stated that it was impossible for Norway and Iceland to carry on the current monitoring mission alone. As such, the GSL and LTTE could either accept that the SLMM would be reduced (with the SLMM's mission thereby being jeopardized) or allow other countries to provide monitors.

15. Comment. The surprisingly frank tone of both the press statement and the diplomatic corps briefing clearly indicate Norway's deep concerns with the current Sri Lankan crises, and its disappointment with the failure of the Oslo talks. Hanssen-Bauer echoed Minister Solheim's statement that "the two parties have not listened to advice" and must "stand by

their responsibilities themselves." Drafting letters to the two parties with specific questions (and a set deadline for responses) illustrates not only concern for the worsening situation, but a clear call that the parties, should they wish to continue the negotiations process, take direct responsibility for their actions.

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